حوار مع الإسرائيليين.. جلسة لمركز باستيت حول تطورات الداخل الإسرائيلي

عقد مركز "باستيت" للدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية حلقته النقاشية السادسة حول "تطورات الداخل الإسرائيلي"، بهدف استكشاف إمكانية توظيف هذه التطورات لصالح الطرف الفلسطيني والعربي في إدارة الصراع مع إسرائيل في هذه المرحلة الحساسة.  
 

وأدار الجلسة  ا.د. أحمد يوسف أحمد، أستاذ العلوم السياسية بجامعة القاهرة  بمشاركة وا.د. أحمد فؤاد أنور- عضو المجلس المصري للشؤون الخارجية وا.د. حاتم العبد-مدير مركز دراسات الشرق الأوسط-جامعة عين شمس السفير حازم خيرت-مساعد وزير الخارجية وسفير مصر الأسبق في إسرائيل د. عبد العليم محمد عبد العليم-مستشار مركز الدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية بالأهرام  د. مختار غباشي-الأمين العام لمركز الفارابي للدراسات السياسية.
 

وقد أجمع المشاركون في الحوار على أهمية دراسة التحولات السابقة بغرض معرفة أوزانها النسبية، كي نتمكن من تحديد الأثر الدقيق لها على مجريات الصراع مع إسرائيل. غير أن اختلافًا وقع في وجهات النظر بين من رأوا إمكان – بل ضرورة – توظيف هذه التحولات في إدارة الصراع مع إسرائيل، وبين من اختلفوا معهم.

فقد رأى الفريق الأول أن ثمة جدوى من العمل على تعزيز التوجهات العاقلة في إسرائيل، على خلفية قبول حل الدولتين كصيغة دنيا لاستعادة الحقوق الفلسطينية. وذلك يتطلب حوارات وتفاهمات من المؤكد أن المجتمع المدني العربي والفلسطيني – بصفة خاصة – هو الأقدر على إدارتها، مع التنسيق الكامل مع المستويات الرسمية العربية وفيما بينها. فضلًا عن أن مساهمة هذه المستويات في بعض الخطوات الموجهة للرأي العام الإسرائيلي يمكن أن تُحدث آثارًا ضخمة في الاتجاه المرغوب.

غير أن الفريق الثاني لم يرَ جدوى من هذا النهج، بسبب حالة التطرف المعروفة عن المجتمع الإسرائيلي، والتي بلغت أوجها في حكومة الائتلاف اليميني المتطرف برئاسة نتنياهو، وضعف القوى التي يمكن أن تكون فاعلة في الدفع نحو تسوية معقولة. ولذلك فإن العمل المباشر لمواجهة السياسة التوسعية العدوانية لإسرائيل هو فقط الذي يمكن التعويل عليه – وهي وجهة نظر تُحترم بطبيعة الحال.

An Invitation to Dialogue on Dealing with Israel’s Domestic Arena
Dr. Ahmed Youssef Ahmed

The Bastet Center for Political and Strategic Studies convened its sixth discussion session on “Developments within Israel’s Domestic Arena,” with the aim of exploring whether these developments can be leveraged in favor of the Palestinian and Arab side in managing the conflict with Israel at this sensitive stage. This comes amid what appears to be a shift in the balance of power in Israel’s favor—particularly after the heavy blows it delivered to the resistance’s support front in Lebanon, and the fall of the Syrian regime, which had served as a corridor for Iranian support to that front.

Participants in the dialogue agreed on the need to draw a new cognitive map of Israel’s domestic scene in light of the developments of the past two years since 7 October 2023. Those two years witnessed the longest war in Israel’s history—if we exclude the War of Attrition on the Egyptian front between the 1967 aggression and the 1973 war. It is well known that these two years left significant impacts on Israel’s domestic arena due to the resilience of the resistance and the Palestinian people, the material and human losses inflicted on Israel (even if they do not compare to the losses of the resistance), the military and political failure to decisively end the war, and the phenomenon of reverse migration out of Israel. This is in addition to important shifts in international public opinion—especially in the West—including within the United States, and even among American Jews themselves.

All of this has contributed to the emergence of more rational tendencies among political forces and former political and military leaders in Israel, some of whom had reached very senior positions. While most of them do not endorse Palestinian and Arab demands, they have adopted comparatively rational positions that call for ending the war, withdrawing from Gaza, and accepting—in principle—the two-state solution. There have also been shifts in Israeli public opinion characterized by instability in the degree of support for, or opposition to, the ruling far-right coalition. Finally, and not least, there are the few voices that have acknowledged and exposed the crime of genocide.

Participants also agreed on the importance of studying these transformations in order to determine their relative weight, so that we can assess their precise impact on the course of the conflict with Israel. However, differences emerged between those who saw the possibility—indeed the necessity—of employing these transformations in managing the conflict with Israel, and those who disagreed.

The first group argued that there is value in working to strengthen the rational tendencies in Israel, on the basis of accepting the two-state solution as a minimum formula for restoring Palestinian rights. This requires dialogues and understandings that Arab and Palestinian civil society—especially—are best positioned to manage, in full coordination with official Arab levels and among them. Moreover, the contribution of these official levels in certain steps directed at Israeli public opinion could generate substantial effects in the desired direction.

The second group, however, saw no value in this approach, given the well-known extremism within Israeli society, which has reached its peak in the far-right coalition government led by Netanyahu, and given the weakness of forces that could effectively push toward a reasonable settlement. Therefore, they argued, only direct action to confront Israel’s expansionist and aggressive policy can be relied upon—a viewpoint that is, of course, worthy of respect.

I clarified my own view: there is no contradiction between the two approaches. What prevents combining them in managing the conflict with Israel? In other words, direct action is indispensable and unavoidable, but attempting to communicate with elements and forces whose positions on the conflict have shifted closer to Palestinian and Arab positions will certainly not be harmful—so long as it is conducted according to a sound vision and a tightly structured, detailed plan. Its returns would be subject to continuous evaluation, enabling improvement, an increase or decrease in pace depending on circumstances, or even abandonment if required.

Opponents of the second approach fear that it may become a pathway to further normalization. Yet there is a significant difference between “normalization” and what might be termed “penetration.” Some experiences of the former have undoubtedly provided support to Israel, while other experiences have been a thorn in its side.